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REMOVING THE EFFECT OF DISCLOSURES FROM

FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: STRIPPING
AWAY THE LAST VESTIGES OF THE AFTERACQUIRED EVIDENCE DOCTRINEt

INTRODUCrION

An employee is fired because the employer believes her to be
too old for her job. The employee then files suit in United States
District Court, seeking a remedy under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA"). The ADEA declares it unlawful to
discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee on the
basis of age.' During the course of pre-trial discovery, the employer learns that when the employee first believed that she was about
to be terminated, she began to remove and copy some of the
employer's documents for later possible use against the employer.
Thus, the employer has discovered that at the time the employee
was originally fired, legal grounds for the discharge existed. Prior
to 1995, the "after-acquired evidence doctrine" operated as an
affirmative defense to such an unlawful and discriminatory dis-

t This note is dedicated to the loving memory of my Grandfather, Abraham Modell,
a self-educated man of tremendous wisdom. He never had anything but the greatest of
confidence that through my abilities I would succeed. This confidence meant more to me
than he ever knew, and gave me the confidence to achieve all that I have throughout my
life. Thanks G-pop.
1. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (1994). Although I refer to the ADEA, I suggest that
this note is not limited to age discrimination. It is routinely recognized that the same
arguments and policies hold true for all of the employment discrimination statutes, including the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(including the modifications to it by the Civil Rights Act of 1991). See McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 884 (1995) (stating that the substantive
policy behind all of the anti-discrimination statutes is to eliminate workplace discrimination); Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (stating that interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply with equal force to the ADEA,
because the substantive provisions of the ADEA were adopted wholesale from Title VII).
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charge. This evidence entitled the employer to summary judgment
in its favor, and the dismissal of the employee's discrimination
suit.
In McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., the United
States Supreme Court held that the after-acquired evidence doctrine
cannot act as a complete bar to recovery under employment discrimination statutes such as the ADEA.2 Allowing after-acquired
evidence to act as a bar would prevent these statutes from deterring workplace discrimination and from compensating for harm
through damages and injunctive relief.3 This change in doctrine
may ultimately change the way all employment discrimination suits
are handled. An employer can often find a reason other than its
discriminatory purpose for firing an employee. This is especially
true with the recent changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the vast amount of open and nondiscretionary pre-trial
disclosure now mandated by them. For this reason, the remedies
courts craft in wrongful discharge cases such as McKennon are
now at the forefront of employment discrimination law.
The 1993 amendments to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require mandatory disclosure to the opposing party
of most information within a party's possession that relates to facts
pleaded with particularity.4 This change forces employment discrimination plaintiffs to disclose to their former employers any
legal grounds for discharge that the employer had at the time of
the allegedly discriminatory discharge, assuming the employer
notified the plaintiff at the Rule 26(f) discovery conference that
after-acquired evidence was one possible affirmative defense. In the
circuits that have allowed after-acquired evidence to act as a complete bar to any liability by the employer, the new Rule 26(a)
operates to undermine the policies behind the employment discrimination statutes by allowing employers easy access to after-acquired
evidence.' To relieve this tension between the polices behind the
anti-discrimination statutes and Rule 26(a), the Supreme Court had
no choice but to hear McKennon, and hold that after-acquired evidence could no longer act as a bar to liability in employment discrimination suits, instead only permitting it to be used as a mitigating factor in the damages phase of the litigation.6
This note will begin with a historical discussion of the after-

2. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886-87.
3. See id. at 884.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See Bob E. Lype, After-Acquired Evidence in Defending Employment Discrimination
Claims, 61 DEF. COUNs. J. 573, 582 (1994) (stating that "the employer [typically] first
learn[s] of the employee's ... misconduct during the course of discovery").
6. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 879.
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acquired evidence doctrine. This discussion will encompass both
the pre-McKennon majority rule, best elucidated in Summers v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.,7 and the modifications of
the doctrine by the Supreme Court in McKennon. Where appropriate, the policies behind the ADEA will be related to this discussion. The focus will then shift to the mandatory discovery rules.
Again, attention will be drawn to likely areas of contention between Rule 26(a) and the ADEA.
The focus of the analysis will be on how, under the Summers
rule, a defendant-employer could construct a good faith defense
based on after-acquired evidence so that it is entitled to mandatory
disclosures by the plaintiff-employee on that evidence during the
pre-discovery process. This discussion of employer strategies under
the Summers rule will show how all of these strategies, combined
with the mandatory disclosure process, undercut the policies behind
the employment discrimination statutes, thereby forcing the Supreme Court to modify the doctrine as it did in McKennon. In
addition, this note argues that because of the timing factors involved in the disclosure and discovery process, the Supreme Court
did not go far enough in its modification of the doctrine. An
employee's recovery will still be severely limited because of the
short time period between the filing of the complaint and the mandatory disclosures. Thus, Rule 26(a)'s mandatory disclosure obligation still operates to undermine the policies behind the employment
discrimination statutes and therefore undercuts the national goal of
eliminating discrimination from the workplace. Finally, the retaliation provisions of Title VII and the ADEA will also be frustrated,
since an employer will no longer have to seek out after-acquired
evidence, which, with the proper discriminatory intent, could be
unlawful in and of itself. For these reasons, the McKennon Court
should have eliminated the after-acquired evidence defense from the
face of employment discrimination law.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Proving a Case of Individual Disparate Treatment
Employment Discrimination

Disparate treatment is defined as "[tihe employer [treating]
some people less favorably than others because of [some protected
characteristic]. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differenc-

7. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
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es in treatment... "[L]iability depends on whether the protected
trait . . . actually motivated the employer's decision."9 The question of motivation can often be very difficult to prove. Short of a
direct statement by the hiring employer to the employee such as
"You are too old and therefore I am not going to hire you," this
key element of intent to discriminate will have to be inferred from
the employer's conduct. In a series of decisions spanning twenty
years, the Supreme Court has stepped in and defined the elements
of proof of inferred discrimination.'0
A plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the plaintiff
belongs to a protected class; (2) the plaintiff applied for and was
qualified for a job the employer was trying to fill; (3) even though
the plaintiff was qualified, he or she was rejected; and (4) the
employer continued to seek applicants with qualifications comparable to the plaintiff." If the plaintiff is able to establish this prima
facie case, which appears to be very easy to do,' an inference
that the employer acted with discriminatory intent arises. 3 The
prima facie case creates an inference of discrimination because its
elements eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory reason for
the plaintiff's rejection, namely, that the plaintiff was not quali14
fied.
Once the plaintiff has established this prima facie case, the
burden of production then shifts to the employer "to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the [employment
decision]"'" in order to rebut the inference of discrimination. The
burden that shifts, however, is not the ultimate burden of persua-

8. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
9. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
10. See infra notes 11-30 and accompanying text.
11. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see also
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1309-10 (1996) (stating that
various circuits have "applied some variant of the basic evidentiary framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas" to claims brought under the ADEA). This prima facie case can be
modified in many ways. For example, Justice Scalia, in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993), would require the plaintiff in order to make out a
prima facie case to show not only that the job remained open, but that it was eventually
filled by someone outside of the plaintiff's protected class (e.g., the employer who rejected the black applicant eventually filled the job with a white applicant). Furthermore, the
prima facie case need not be strictly adhered to by a plaintiff. The elements can vary
slightly depending on what type of discrimination of the plaintiff is attempting to prove.
See BARBARA L. SCHLFi & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 10 (2d
ed. & Supp. 1987-89).
12. See MICHAEL J. ZIMMER Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DisCRIMINATION 118 (3d ed. 1994).
13. See Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
14. See id. at 253-54.
15. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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sion, but only the burden of production. The ultimate burden of
persuading the jury that intentional discrimination actually took
place always rests with the plaintiff. 6 The only burden to shift is
the burden of producing evidence." Thus, the defendant must,
through the introduction of admissible evidence, rebut the inference
of discrimination established in the plaintiff's prima facie case.
This evidence need not persuade the court that those reasons actually motivated the employer's conduct, but needs to raise a genuine
issue of fact as to whether discrimination actually existed. 8 If
such evidence is produced, the inference that arose from the
plaintiff's prima facie case is rebutted, and the burden of production shifts back to the plaintiff.' If the defendant cannot articulate
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, either summary judgment or
a directed verdict will be granted for the plaintiff.
If the defendant has removed the initial inference of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff can still prevail if he can prove that the
reasons the defendant proffered were not the real reasons for the
rejection or termination.' The plaintiff then has a "full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up
for a ... discriminatory decision."' Beside showing that the
employer's articulated reason was not the true motivating reason, a
plaintiff can show pretext in a variety of other ways, including
presenting evidence of the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff,
the defendant's general attitude, policy, and practice towards civil
rights and minority employment, and statistics of the composition
of the defendant's workforceY
In 1993, however, the Supreme Court in St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks,' modified this entire system of proof by adding
an element to the plaintiff's burden of proving discriminatory intent.24 Before Hicks, the plaintiff only had to establish pretext by
a preponderance of the evidence to raise the inference of discriminatory intent.' Under Hicks, a plaintiff also has to establish pretext.' The Court added that the plaintiff must also prove that he

16. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
17. See id. at 254.
18. See id. at 254-55.
19. See id. at 255-56.
20. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805; see also O'Connor v. Consolidated
Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1309-10 (1996).
21. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805.
22. See id. at 804-05.
23. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
24. See id. at 514-15.
25. See Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981).
26. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 506.
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was in fact discriminated against, since the plaintiff always retains
the ultimate burden of persuasion.' The Court rejected the position that a showing of pretext warrants a per se finding of discriminatory intent.28 It found this an untenable position because the
ultimate question to be answered in all disparate treatment cases is
whether it is more likely than not that the defendant intentionally
discriminated against the plaintiff in an employment decision, not
whether the proof system laid out in Supreme Court decisions has
been followed to the letter.29 These burdens and methods of proof
are used only when there is no direct evidence.3"
A similar problem arises if the employer, although clearly
acting out of a discriminatory motive, has one or more legitimate
business reasons for the employment decision at the time of that
decision. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 the Supreme Court
held that once a plaintiff proves that some protected characteristic
played "a motivating part" in an employment decision, the burden
of persuasion then shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "it would have made the same decision
even if it had not taken the plaintiff's [protected characteristic] into
' With the Civil Rights Act of 1991, this rule has been
account."32
changed and liability will be found as long as the plaintiff can
prove that the protected characteristic at issue was "a motivating
factor for any employment practice."33 The employer can avoid
certain remedies, such as reinstatement and back pay, by a showing
that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the
improper motive. 4 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not take the
award of attorney's fees away from plaintiffs.35 This decision prevented the creation of a huge disincentive to bringing suit. Thus,
the Price Waterhouse rule is no longer applicable in the liability
stage of the trial, but it becomes applicable in the remedy stage.

27. See id. at 514-15.
28. See id. at 515-16. The dissent in Hicks found that proving pretext also proves
discriminatory intent, and therefore under Burdine, a plaintiff should not have to prove
both. See id. at 534-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 510-11; see also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983) (finding that a district court should not decide the issue of
discriminatory intent any differently than it decides any other issue of fact since the issue
always is whether it is more likely than not that the employer discriminated against the
employee).
30. See Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715 (citing Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567,
577 (1978)).
31. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
32. Id. at 258.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1994).
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
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The distinction between mixed motive and after-acquired evidence analysis is important to understand. Mixed motive analysis
applies when, at the time of the firing, there is direct evidence of
discriminatory intent along with contemporaneous evidence of a
nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.36 After-acquired evidence analysis applies where the only motive present at the time of
the employment decision was unlawful under the ADEA or Title
VII, whether proven by direct evidence or inferred through
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny.37 The employer does not
discover the legitimate grounds for firing the employee until after
the employee was fired for the allegedly discriminatory reason.
This distinction is important because the mixed motive analysis
was affected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and courts have held
that this change does not apply to cases in which after-acquired
evidence is present.38
B.

The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine

1. The Pre-McKennon Majority Rule: Summers and its Progeny
The after-acquired evidence doctrine operates when an employer discovers other justifications for discharge, having already fired
an employee for an allegedly discriminatory reason.39 The afteracquired evidence must be such that the employer would have fired
the employee had the employer known of the evidence at the time
of the discharge.' The seminal case in defining this doctrine and
its role in employment discrimination litigation was Summers v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co.4 The Summers court,
however, took much of its analysis from an older Fourth Circuit

36. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
37. See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Systems, Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1166-68 (6th Cir.
1996) (determining the after-acquired evidence defense is not properly utilized until after
reaching the threshold issue of whether an employer intentionally discriminated against its
employee).
38. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct at 885; see also Tory E. Griffen, Note, McKennon v.
Nashville Banner Publishing Co.: The Future Role of After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation, 74 OR. L. REv. 781, 786-802 (1995) (stating that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not work to limit remedies in after-acquired evidence cases
because the Supreme Court expressly stated that the mixed motive analysis the 1991 Act
modified is analytically distinct from after-acquired evidence analysis).
39. The doctrine has been utilized in a number of contexts, but the most prevalent are
resume or employment application fraud, document theft, and undiscovered poor job performance. See infra notes 124-37, and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Sprang, After-Acquired Evidence: Tonic for an Employer's
Cognitive Dissonance, 60 MO. L. REV. 89, 90-97 (1995); Ann C. McGinley, Reinventing
Reality: The Impermissible Intrusion of After-Acquired Evidence in Title VII Litigation, 26
CONN. L. Rlv. 145, 191-93 (1993).
41. 864 F.2d 700 (10th Cir. 1988).
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case, Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc.' After the decision in
Summers, the doctrine gained approval in a majority of the circuits
that considered the issue.'
The Summers rule itself is very simply and easily stated. What
is difficult to understand is the rationale that the Summers court
and the other circuits have used to justify it, especially in light of
what the Supreme Court has said on the subject.' The rule simply states that after-acquired evidence may preclude a court from
granting any relief to the plaintiff.45 The substantive issue of
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated is never reached
if the defendant is able to show that the employee would have
been discharged regardless of the discriminatory motive, had the
misconduct been known at the time of the discharge.' The elements of the Summers rule, as applied by later courts, are: "(1) the
employer was unaware of the misconduct when the employee was
discharged; (2) the misconduct would have justified discharge; and
(3) the employer would indeed have discharged the employee, had
the employer known of the misconduct."'47 There is no requirement that the employee's conduct was "serious or pervasive," but
only that it could have justified a legal discharge or refusal to
hire. 4
The facts of Summers illustrate exactly how the rule operated
before the Supreme Court overruled it. State Farm discharged Summers, a claims representative, because of a continuation of suspicious claims and poor work attitude after he had been placed on
probation.49 Summers claimed, however, that State Farm fired him
because of his age and religion." During pretrial discovery, State
42. 728 F.2d 614 (4th Cir. 1984).
43. See, e.g., Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1405 (8th Cir.
1994) (citing the Summers rationale in deciding to award summary judgment to an employer in a wrongful discharge action alleging discrimination on the basis of disability);
O'Driscoll v. Hercules Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 180-81 (10th Cir. 1994) (awarding summary
judgment for the employer on the grounds that under Summers, the employee's actions
would have justified termination), vacated, remanded, 115 S. Ct. 1086 (1995); McKennon
v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993), rev'd 115 S. Ct. 879
(1995); Washington v. Lake County, II1., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying the
Summers rationale to a mixed-motive employment discrimination case); Johnson v.
Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 1992) (applying the
Summers rationale in awarding summary judgment in favor of an employer in a civil
rights action).
44. See infra Part H.B.2.
45. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
46. See id.
47. O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 179; see also Johnson, 955 F.2d at 414 (requiring employer
to show that the after-acquired evidence provides valid and legitimate grounds for discharge).
48. O'Driscoll, 12 F.3d at 179.
49. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 702-03.
50. See id. at 702 (noting that Summers was a fifty-six year old member of the Mor-
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Farm learned of over 150 instances of falsification of records by
Summers.5 ' They were granted summary judgment based on this
after-acquired evidence. 2
In affirming the summary judgment ruling of the district court,
the Tenth Circuit made two basic assumptions concerning this type
of case. First, the court gave very little weight to the reasons that
State Farm gave for their discharge of Summers at the time of the
firing. The court only considered the evidence of the new misconduct that was revealed during pretrial discovery. The court found
that the newly discovered legitimate reason for the discharge rendered the alleged discriminatory reason irrelevant. 3 Second, the
court assumed that State Farm was at least partially motivated, at
the time of the discharge, by Summers' age and religion.54 However, the court found the presence of a discriminatory motive to be
irrelevant. They relied on the Mt. Healthy line of mixed motive
cases, which hold that an employer can be partially motivated by
an illegal purpose and not be liable for a wrongful discharge if the
employee would have been fired for the legal reason alone.55
Thus, the Summers court concluded that the serious misconduct that State Farm discovered during discovery predated the
firing of Summers for a discriminatory reason, and that State Farm
would have fired Summers at the earlier date had it known of the
misconduct at the time.56 Summers could not receive any relief
because while the after-acquired evidence is not relevant to the
cause of his discharge, it is relevant to his ability to receive
damages, since he should have been fired anyway. According to
mon Church).
51. See id. at 703.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 704.
54. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
55. See id. at 705; see also Mt. Healthy City School Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 285 (1977) (discussing the importance of motivation); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (concluding that an employer can prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the employer would have made the same employment decision even
without considering the employee's protected characteristic). The Summers court reasoned
that the discriminatory motive is irrelevant because the employee could have been fired at
the same time for the legitimate reason, even though that reason was discovered later. See
Summers, 864 F.2d at 708; see also Smallwood v. United Airlines, Inc., 728 F.2d 614,
623 (4th Cir 1984) (stating that in "after-the-fact" cases such as this, the newly acquired
evidence is to be treated with the same weight as any other evidence, and if believed
leads to a dismissal of the case under Mt. Healthy). The Price Waterhouse line of cases
was overruled by Congress with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(1994) (stating that in order for a plaintiff to recover in a mixed motive case, the plaintiff need only prove that a characteristic such as race or sex was "a motivating factor for
any employment practice"). For a further explanation of this point, see supra notes 32-35
and accompanying text.
56. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 708.
57. See id. at 704. The Summers court justified this by stating that "[t]o argue . . .
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the Summers court, no damages should be granted at all, not even
back pay from the date of discharge, because, based on the afteracquired evidence, the plaintiff had no legal right to the job in the
first place." This rationale fails for many reasons, and it led the
Supreme Court to overturn the Summers rule in McKennon5
2. Summers Questioned: The Transition From Summers to
McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.
In 1994, the Supreme Court finally granted certiorari to an
after-acquired evidence doctrine case in order to settle the split
among the circuits.60 A majority of the circuits had followed Summers in allowing after-acquired evidence to act as a complete defense to discriminatory practices by an employer. 6' A growing
minority of the circuits, however, was beginning to see flaws in
this reasoning. This minority began to hold that after-acquired
evidence could not be used as an affirmative defense in an employment discrimination suit, but could be used in the damages
phase of the litigation to eliminate certain remedies such as front
pay and reinstatement.62 Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co.63
provides the best example of the pre-McKennon line of cases. The
Mardell court held that after-acquired evidence was irrelevant at
the liability stage of the litigation because the employer did not
know of the employee's misconduct when the employee was
fired.64 Thus, the employer could only have had a discriminatory
motive, and the plaintiff was entitled to recovery if the prima facie
case of disparate treatment was established.65 This reasoning sets
after-acquired evidence cases apart from mixed motive cases, where
an employer possesses a discriminatory motive and a non-discriminatory, legitimate reason for firing the employee at the time of discharge.' The court stressed the traumatic and dehumanizing effect
that this after-acquired evidence should be ignored is utterly unrealistic." Id. at 708.
58. See id. at 708; see also Smallwood, 728 F.2d at 626 (finding an award of back
pay untenable because the plaintiff should not have been hired in the first place).
59. See infra Part I.B.3.
60. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994).
61. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
62. See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that after-acquired evidence is inadmissible at the liability stage but may be used in
the remedies phase); Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 370 (7th Cir.
1993) (noting that after-acquired evidence is not admissible in an employment discrimination suit but can be used in the damages phase); Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968
F.2d 1174, 1181-82 (11th Cir. 1992) (observing that after-acquired evidence that employee
lied on application is not a legitimate cause for terminating the employee).
63. 31 F.3d 1221.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 1228-30. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text for a comparison
of how after-acquired evidence differs from mixed motive analysis.
66. See Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1229.
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that discrimination causes its victim.' Whether an employee
lacked a legal right to a job because of prior misconduct or misrepresentations later discovered does not change the nature of the
employer's intentionally discriminatory conduct or its damaging
effect on the employee victim.6 8 The court illustrated this point by
analogizing to tort law:
Imagine... an employer which intentionally batters an
employee who procured his or her position through fraud
or who falsified company records. The Summers rationale
would bar the employee's recovery in an appropriate action
because the employee had no "right" to be where he or she
was at the moment of his or her injury. Surely that result
flies 9 in the face of reason and the whole body of tort
law.

6

The Mardell court concluded that this question does not depend on
whether an employee has a right to a job, but instead depends on
whether an employer violated federal law."°
This court also found the Summers rule to have completely
ignored the harm to society that is done by an employer who
intentionally discriminates. This country has a "forceful public
policy vilifying discrimination," and while "the employee's misconduct or fraud is a possible wrong against the employer ... the
employer's discrimination is a wrong against the employee and
society at large."'" The balance must be struck for the latter over
the former. This is linked to a key point that the McKennon Court
recognizes-a refusal to grant liability undermines both the deterrent and compensatory policies of the anti-discrimination statutes.72
The deterrent policy is accomplished by placing an economic value
on the acts of the employer and by exposing that employer's
wrongs to the general community.73 The compensatory policy is
accomplished by placing the employee in a position no worse off
than he or she would have been had the discrimination never taken

67. See id. at 1231-33.
68. See id.
69. Id. at 1231.
70. See id. at 1233.
71. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1234.
72. See id. at 1235-1238 (describing how the Summers rule undermines the key policies behind Title VII and the ADEA: deterrence of future acts of employment discrimination and compensation for those employees who had been harmed by the discriminatory
actions of their employers).
73. See id. at 1235. This policy is needed to encourage other employers to take steps
to educate themselves and their employees about the civil rights of their employees. See
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place.74 According to the Mardell court, the best way to accomplish these policies, taking the after-acquired evidence into account,
is by denying the plaintiff any front pay or reinstatement, and
allowing recovery of back pay only to the date at which the employer discovered the after-acquired evidence.'
Thus, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
McKennon case, it was faced with a clear conflict. Should an employee be denied relief for discrimination because that employee
should not have been hired in the first place, per Summers? Or,
should the Congressional mandate against discrimination in employment be upheld by allowing after-acquired evidence to only operate
as a bar to remedies that depend on an employee's continued right
to employment, such as front pay and reinstatement, per Mardell?
This conflict necessitated a balancing of the right of employees to
be free from discriminatory conduct by their employers with the
right of an employer to run its business and have freedom in its
personnel decisions. The balance struck by the court in McKennon
resulted in the elimination of the Summers rule and the weakening
of the after-acquired evidence doctrine.
3.

Summers Overturned: McKennon v. Nashville Banner
Publishing Co.

Christine McKennon had worked for the Nashville Banner for
thirty years.76 At the time of her discharge she was sixty-two
years old, and had heard rumors that the company was going to
begin to discharge some of its older workers." In anticipation of
being fired, McKennon began to copy confidential Banner files, for
both "insurance" and "protection" should she be fired.78 When the
Banner fired her, she sued the company under the ADEA.79 During discovery disclosures," the Banner learned of the files that
McKennon had pilfered and immediately notified her that these
acts were violative of her employment responsibilities."' The Ban74. See id. at 1237.
75. See id. at 1239-40. This remedy balances the interest of the employee in being
compensated for the harm that the employer caused and the interests of the employer in
not ignoring the after-acquired evidence and maintaining some level of managerial discretion and control in hiring and firing decisions. See id.; see also Kristufek v. Hussmann
Food Service Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369-70 (7th Cir. 1993) (granting remedy of back pay to
employee in after-acquired evidence case, but doing so by distinguishing Sumners on the
fact that the employer in that case had knowledge of the employee's misconduct before
he was fired, and in this case the employer possessed no such knowledge).
76. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 882.
77. See id. at 883.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. It should be emphasized that the Banner learned of McKennon's misconduct during
discovery disclosures, and not through its own effort. See id.
81. It should be noted that McKennon's acts were probably also a breach of the im-
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ner also notified her that it would have fired her at the time if it
had known that she had been copying files."
The district court granted the Banner's motion for summary
judgment based on this after-acquired evidence, holding that
McKennon's misconduct constituted legal grounds for her termination." The Sixth Circuit unanimously affirmed.84 Thus, the issue
before the Supreme Court was "whether all relief must be denied
when an employee has been discharged in violation of the ADEA
and the employer later discovers some wrongful conduct that would
have led to discharge if it had been discovered earlier.""5 The
Supreme Court answered with a unanimous no, holding that afteracquired evidence cannot act as a per se bar to liability in an
ADEA suit.86
The Court began its analysis by looking at the overall scheme
of the employment discrimination statutes. The purpose of these
statutes is the elimination of all discrimination in the workplace,
whether it is based on race, color, sex, religion, national origin, or
age. The Court noted that this eradication of workplace discrimination is accomplished through both the compensation of victims
of discriminatory acts and the deterrence of future discriminatory
acts.88 "It would not accord with this scheme if after-acquired
evidence of wrongdoing that would have resulted in termination
operates, in every instance, to bar all relief for an earlier violation
of the Act."89 The denial of relief in any employment discrimination case where the discrimination actually occurred frustrates the
objectives of the statutory scheme against employment discriminaplied duty of loyalty that every employee owes to her employer. Cf. NLRB v. Local
1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464, 472 (1953) (emphasizing the common "contractual relation
between employer and employee that is born of loyalty to their common enterprise").
82. See id.
83. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 797 F. Supp. 604, 608 (M.D.
Tenn. 1992).
84. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 1993)
(following Summers).
85. McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 883.
86. See id. at 886 (stating that an absolute rule barring recovery would undermine the
ADEA's objective).
87. See id. at 884.
88. See id.; see also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976)
(noting that federal courts have discretion to "order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay . . . or any other equitable relief the court deems appropriate"); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (observing that the
method of deterrence used here was ordering petitioners to implement a system of
"plantwide" seniority); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974) (indicating that cooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means of
meeting the goal of eliminating those practices and devices which discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
89. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884.
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tion. Thus, the per se rule of Summers had to be overturned to
avoid frustrating the policies of these statutes."°
The remaining question that the Court addressed was the role
that after-acquired evidence would play if it was no longer a complete defense for an employer. The Court ruled that it should only
come into play as a mitigating factor at the remedial stage of the
litigation."' Equitable remedies such as reinstatement to the
employee's old position, which is one remedy available under the
employment discrimination statutes, should not be available.9' Equity requires that a party must come into court with clean hands.93
A plaintiff who could have been fired had the employer discovered
the proper grounds in a timely manner probably does not have
clean hands.94 Furthermore, the Court also had to consider the
legitimate interests of the employer under the ADEA to handle
non-discriminatory decisions of hiring and firing free from government interference.
Thus, in balancing the deterrent and compensatory policies of
the statutes, the Court concluded that the proper remedy to be
afforded to a plaintiff in this scenario is back pay calculated from
the date of the discharge to the date that the employer discovered
the after-acquired evidence.96 It is unfair to expect an employer to
ignore evidence of a legal grounds for discharge once discovered.97 Therefore, "[w]here an employer seeks to rely upon afteracquired evidence of wrongdoing, it must first establish that the
wrongdoing was of such severity that the employee. . . would
have been terminated on those grounds alone if the employer had
known of it at the time of the discharge."9'

90. See id. at 884-85 (stating that the decision in Summers is inapplicable in the present case because unlike Summers, which was a mixed motives case, the sole basis for
firing McKennon was an unlawful motive).
91. See id. at 886.
92. See id. (concluding that reinstatement would be "inequitable and pointless" because
the employer would have and will terminate the employee in any event).
93. The doctrine of unclean hands states that "a court of equity may deny relief to a
party whose conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and deceitful, but . . . only when the
reprehensible conduct complained of pertains to the controversy at issue." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1524 (6th ed. 1990); see also McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 885 (stating a
litigant's clean hands are a prerequisite for receiving equitable relief).
94. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886 (holding that the employee's wrongdoing must
be taken into account when awarding damages).
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. (declaring that this holds even if the evidence might not have been discovered absent the suit).
98. Id. at 886-87. Although the Court never explicitly stated which party would have
the burden of proof in a case in which the defendant is using after-acquired evidence, it
seems from the quoted language that the burden of proof would fall on the employer. See
id.
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C. The 1993 Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules
In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to
include a provision for mandatory disclosure of witness names,
documents, and a computation of damages at a very early stage in
the litigation-prior to the start of formal discovery." Mandatory
means a party must make these disclosures within ten days of the
Rule 26(f) discovery conference." Thus, a party is not allowed
to await a request for the material covered under this rule. This
rule puts in place a series of disclosure requirements that must be
followed by the litigants unless a court imposes other disclosure
rules or rejects all such disclosure requirements.' 0 '
There are several reasons given for the adoption of this provision. By requiring parties to disclose the basic information that the
opposing party needs to prepare for trial or make an informed
decision about discovery without the receipt of any formal discovery request, both the discovery and trial processes are facilitated

99. The amendments were incorporated into Rule 26(a), which states in part:
(a) Required Disclosures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(1) Initial Disclosures. . . . [A] party shall, without awaiting a discovery
request provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number
of each individual likely to have discoverable information relevant
to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all
documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the
disclosing party, making available for inspection and copying as
under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary material, not
privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent
of injuries suffered; and
. . . Mhese disclosures shall be made at or within 10 days after the meeting
of the parties under subdivision (f). A party shall make its initial disclosures
based on the information then reasonably available to it and is not excused
from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its investigation
of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (emphasis added).
100. Rule 26(f) reads as follows:

mhe

parties shall, as soon as practicable . . . meet to discuss the nature and
basis of their claims and defenses . . . to make or arrange for the disclosures
required by subdivision (a)(1), and to develop a proposed discovery plan.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(f).
101. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes.
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and expedited. 2 Thus, the exchange of basic information between the parties becomes accelerated and unnecessary delay in the
litigation process is eliminated. 3 The amendments accomplish
these goals by making certain later modes of discovery unnecessary, since the information has already been provided. These goals
are accomplished by focusing the remaining discovery, narrowing
the issues and information for trial, facilitating trial preparation by
placing key information in the hands of both sides early in the
process, and opening the possibility for a quick settlement. 4 This
rule was based on the experience of experimental rules of district
courts, authorized under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990.15
The operation of Rule 26(a)(1) is fairly simple in theory, which
is not to say that it is simple in practice."°6 The duty to disclose
the names of people with discoverable information relevant to the
dispute under Rule 26(a)(1)(A) applies whether the information will
support or harm the disclosing party's case, and the disclosure
must state the general topic about which that person possesses
information. 7 None of this is meant to place an undue burden
on the disclosing party.' 8 Instead, Rule 26(a)(1)(B)'s directive to
disclose documents relevant to the dispute is meant to act as a replacement for routine document requests that accompany most
lawsuits under Rule 34. It also is meant to help parties decide
what documents they want to compel the other party to turn over
under Rule 34 and to avoid future disputes over document production."° Additionally, it is not necessary to give an itemized list of
all documents and tangible items; only a description and categorization of the locations of potentially relevant documents is needed."0

102. See id.
103. See id.; see also Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through
Disclosure: Is It Time Again for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991) (examining two competing efforts to reform the discovery process); William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules,
the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703 (1989) (finding
discovery form has had no benefits on the adversarial process).
104. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes.
105. See Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 45
AM. U. L. REv. 1, 43 n.305 (1995).
106. For example, the question of what exactly is a "disputed fact alleged with particularity" has spawned satellite issues for litigation that either district court judges or magistrate judges now have to manage.
107. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes.
108. See id. (stating that disclosure should not be burdensome and will be helpful to
other parties).
109. See id.
I10. See id.
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The most difficult issue in this area is interpreting the meaning
of the phrase "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity
in the pleadings'. First, vague averments that satisfy typical
notice pleading requirements will not compel a party to disclose
any information under Rule 26(a)."' Second, the greater the specificity and clarity of the averments in the pleadings, the more complete the disclosures under Rule 26(a) will be." 3 Third, disclosures are not limited to statements in the pleadings, but will be
defined and narrowed by the discussions during the Rule 26(f)
discovery conference.' Finally, this rule simply calls for the parties to act with common sense when making these disclosures,
keeping in mind the policies and purposes that this rule is meant
to serve."5
These new rules have not gone without their fair share of
criticism, evidenced by the fact that around half of the judicial
districts have opted out of them in one way or another." 6 They
have also been publicly criticized, most notably by Justice
Scalia." 7 First, he asserted that these new rules add a further layer of discovery by forcing litigants and district court judges to
litigate exactly what items are relevant to disputed facts, whether
those facts were alleged with particularity, and whether each party
adequately made its initial disclosures."' Thus, while these rules
are intended to save time and expense in the litigation process,
they may actually have the exact opposite effect by adding this
new layer of discovery to all civil cases. Second, Justice Scalia
argued that these rules are inconsistent with the notion of our
adversarial civil justice system." 9 The new rules obligate attorneys to turn over to the opposing side information that is damaging to their own case. In addition, these disclosure mechanisms
place too great of a strain on the ethical duty of an attorney to
represent the client's interests. 2 These arguments become exceptionally relevant to the discussion of the operation of the afteracquired evidence doctrine under this new regime of mandatory
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A).
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Although 49 out of the 94 federal judicial districts have opted out of the initial
disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a), 20 of the opt-out districts have adopted local rules
to cover mandatory disclosures. See Implementation of Rule 26's Disclosure Requirements,
10 No. 4 FED. LrnATOR 115 (June 1995).
117. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 507 U.S. 1089, 1096 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
118. See id. at 1099.
119. See id. at 1100.
120. See id.
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disclosures.'2 1 It is exactly the result that Justice Scalia predicted
that helped to undermine the Summers rule and caused the eventual
eradication of this rule by the Supreme Court in McKennon.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RULE 26, THE SUMMERS RULE, AND
THE POLICIES BEHIND THE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION STATUTES: How
THE STATUTES ARE CIRCUMVENTED THROUGH MANDATORY
DIsCLOsuRES OF AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE
11.

A.

Preliminary Steps That an Employer Must Take to Assure
That After-Acquired Evidence is Available for a Summary
Judgment Motion

The basic goal of any employer who becomes a defendant in
an employment discrimination suit is summary judgment." Since
the after-acquired evidence doctrine was one weapon that an employer had within its arsenal in which to gain summary judgment,
it becomes crucial to look at exactly what an employer had to do,
pre-McKennon, to increase the likelihood that summary judgment
would be granted based on after-acquired evidence. Once the
employer's strategy is clarified, it is easier to see exactly how Rule
26(a) fits into this strategy.
The biggest impact that the Summers rule had in the employment setting occurred in the formulation of personnel policies."
Commentators have suggested various pre-employment procedures
for an employer to follow to maximize the effectiveness of the
after-acquired evidence doctrine. For example, an employer should
state clearly on the employment application itself, or within a personnel policy manual, that resume fraud or application misrepresentations will result in suspension, investigation, and possible discharge.'24 Under the Summers rule, this statement will clearly aid
an employer in showing that a discharge would have resulted at
that time had the deception been known."a Furthermore, the

121. See infra Parts Il-IlI.
122. See Ellen M. Martin, Dispositive Motions in Federal Employment Discrimination
Cases, C780 ALI-ABA 859, 863 (1993).
123. See James A. Burnstein & Steven L. Hamann, Better Late Than Never--After-Acquired Evidence in Employment Discrimination Cases, 19 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J.,
193, 20203 (1993) (discussing how the after-acquired evidence doctrine should affect personnel
policies); George D. Mesritz, "After-Acquired" Evidence of Pre-Employment Misrepresentations: An Effective Defense Against Wrongful Discharge Claims, 18 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ.,
215, 216 (1992) (stating that the "ability to use 'after-acquired' evidence as a defense . . . depends on whether the employer laid the necessary groundwork by eliciting
detailed information before the employee was hired").
124. Burnstein & Hamann, supra note 123, at 202-03.
125. Id. An example of a well written disclaimer on an employment application is, "I
understand . . .that the submission of any false information in connection with my appli-
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questions on employment applications should be narrowed so that
the background information elicited can easily be double-checked
for its veracity." These narrowly tailored questions allow an employer to complete a thorough background check of an employee
to screen out persons who have misrepresented themselves. 27
It is insufficient for an employer to have the above-mentioned
application and background procedures if the employer omits others. First, the employer must make sure that its rules concerning
resume fraud and application misrepresentation are uniformly followed throughout the company.' A failure to do so will bolster
an employee's subsequent discrimination claim by providing additional evidence of disparate treatment.' 29 Second, an employer
should not wait to fire an employee once it learns or knows of
some legitimate grounds for termination. 3 A failure to do so in
a timely manner will make it hard for an employer to assert that it
learned of legitimate grounds only after a discharge for a discriminatory purpose.' Waiting to fire the employee suggests the employer has a pretextual reason for firing the employee.
Of course, all of these policies refer to situations that serve to
minimize any need for after-acquired evidence in the first place. If
the policies function properly, employees with improper credentials
or shady backgrounds will not be hired in the first place. These
policies also create a paper trail that the employer can use after an
employee sues for discharge due to an allegedly discriminatory
purpose. This should be done prior to any discovery, so that the
employer's attorney knows exactly what is to be sought in the
At this point, the detailed applications,
discovery conference.'

cation for employment, whether or not on this document or not, may be cause for immediate discharge at any time thereafter ...." Mesritz, supra note 123, at 216 (quoting the
employer's policy from Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409
(6th Cir. 1992)).
126. See Mesritz, supra note 123, at 222-23. These questions should contain specific
references to degrees obtained, dates, addresses, and phone numbers of all schools attended, jobs held, levels of experience at prior jobs, and specific reference to felony convictions. See id.
127. Some studies have found that up to 30% of job applicants have either inflated
their credentials or hidden embarrassing facts about their past. See David G. Savage, Digging Up Dirt on Fired Worker Won't Kill Bias Suit, L. A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at All;
see also Joan E. Rigdon, Deceptive Resumes Can be Door Openers but Can Become an
Employee's Undoing, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1992, at B1 (stating that around one-third of
all resumes include misrepresentations).
128. See Burnstein & Hamann, supra note 123, at 202-03.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. See Lype, supra note 5, at 582 (implying the need for quick action after a termination in order to assure that after-acquired evidence issues are properly framed for discovery).
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resume, any notes from pre-employment interviews, etc., should be
scrutinized for any errors that the employer did not discover.' In
addition, the use of credit agencies and private investigators has
also been suggested as a means of gathering information that the
employee
omitted or misrepresented on his application or re13 4
sume.
The discovery of on-the-job employee misconduct through posttermination investigations also plays a pivotal role in this context
and can assist an attorney in framing the issue before the discovery
conference. Examples include immediate internal audits of expense
reports, time records, and expense records, going through an
employee's personnel file with a fine-toothed comb, and the questioning of supervisors and co-workers.'35 The employer hopes that
some on-the-job misconduct will be discovered so that he can
claim that he had a legal rationale under which to fire
the employee, even though the employer was unaware of this fact
36
at the time.'
The interplay between the employer's goal of minimizing personnel mistakes, the above-mentioned techniques that should be
utilized to achieve that goal, the Summers rule, and the undermining of the policies behind the employment discrimination statutes
that occur through mandatory disclosures is best understood in light
of the role that discovery plays in employment discrimination cases. All of these factors further the policies that Rule 26(a) was
amended to reflect-the exchange of basic information in the preparation for discovery and trials and the elimination of unnecessary
delays in the litigation process. 137 Obviously, information that
tends to show the existence of after-acquired evidence is basic
information that an employer-defendant needs for trial preparation.
If this information leads to summary judgment, the litigation process will then be significantly accelerated. Under McKennon, the
presentation will not result in summary judgment for the employer,
but instead a verdict for the employee and the resulting mitigation
of the employer's damages.
By forcing the discovery of certain information earlier in the
discovery process, an employer is able to obtain information from
the employee before an employee has an opportunity to react to

133. See id.
134. See id. at 583. This information might include prior convictions, terminations for
cause from other employment, and other "damning" information that a prospective employee may, for very good reason at the time, desire to conceal from a prospective employer. See id.
135. See id. at 583.
136. See id.
137. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
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the employer's defense.' This hastened process allows an employer to learn very early in the litigation process whether there is
any substance behind after-acquired evidence defense. Rule 26(a)
speeds up this process by requiring the plaintiff to disclose at least
the location of certain information at his disposal. 3 9 But automatic disclosures will require employers to lay out the elements of
their affirmative defense, so an employer cannot surprise an employee with the after-acquired evidence defense at trial."4 Thus, if
an employee is aware of the probability of an employer using this
defense, the employee's attorney could coach him how to craft the
answers to later depositions and interrogatories to defeat summary
judgment. 4'
The argument that mandatory disclosures will ultimately hurt an
employer fails for several reasons. The duty to disclose works both
ways. The defendant's attorney will have information obtained from
the plaintiff at his disposal when the further discovery requests are
being crafted, and no attorney can coach a witness to lie in response to certain questions. In other words, the rules are meant to
help ascertain the truth, and the truth will, in theory, come out.
Thus, the element of surprise is not necessary, especially when the
after-acquired evidence so clearly favors the employer.
Parallel arguments to those above can be made for the early
disclosure of documents. 42 These disclosures are important because many pieces of evidence on which an employer will base his
motion for summary judgment will be documents and records. Although this rule requires only disclosure of the location of documents, this will cause little problem for the employer because at
least he will be aware of their existence. Examples of the use of
documents in after-acquired evidence cases include school records
and transcripts to show that an employee lied on either his resume
or job application, 43 criminal records to show that an employee

138. See Martin, supra note 122, at 875 (stating that by taking a deposition an employer is allowed to resolve plaintiff's inconsistencies at an early stage in the litigation).
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (providing that information be disclosed without waiting for a discovery request and even if the party has not completed its investigation or
the other party has not made its disclosures).
140. See Christopher R. Hedican & Timothy D. Loudon, The 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Their Anticipated Impact on Employment Litigation, 28
CREIGHTON L. REv. 997, 1011-12 (1995).
141. See id.
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) (requiring "a copy of, or a description by category
and location of all documents").
143. See Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150, 1152 (6th Cir.
1995) (noting that employee lied about his employment background and medical history
on his resume); Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 470 (8th Cir. 1995)
(noting that employee had falsified her educational qualifications on her job application);
Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, 1404 (8th Cir. 1994) (using

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:117

lied about past felonies or other convictions,'" and documents
belonging to an employer that the employee either copied or
stole. 45 All of these fact patterns are highly relevant because they
are all examples of situations where summary judgment was granted under the Summers rule to foreclose any remedy to a discriminated-against employee."4
These same arguments repeat themselves in the context of the
Rule 26(f) discovery conference. Assuming that the employer followed the above procedures so that he has a good faith belief in
the availability of the after-acquired evidence defense,147 the employer will be able to insist, at the discovery conference, upon the
disclosure of anything that might indicate the existence of legitimate grounds for dismissal." This insistence includes any information in the plaintiff's past that would have disqualified him for
the job in the first place, or plaintiff's performance problems on
the job, such that the employer would have had a legal ground on
which to fire that employee because of those performance problems. 49

employee's failure to disclose a dismissal from a previous place of employment as a basis
for granting summary judgment); O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 177-78 (10th
Cir. 1994) (citing employee's falsifications on employment application, security clearance
form, and health insurance application); Kristufek v. Hussman Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d
364, 366 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that plaintiff lied about educational qualifications on the
job application); Washington v. Lake County, 111.,969 F.2d 250, 252 (7th Cir. 1992)
(using personnel records to prove past violations of employer's policy); Johnson v.
Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 412 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing
employee's falsification on her employment application regarding her educational background); Summers v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 701 (10th
Cir. 1988) (involving employee's falsification of business records); Quillen v. American
Tobacco Co., 874 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (noting that plaintiff lied on her
employment application by misrepresenting her reasons for leaving two previous positions).
The majority of after-acquired evidence cases arise in the context of resume or application
fraud.
144. See Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 1992)
(noting that employee lied on employment application regarding narcotics conviction);
Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro, 35 Cal. App. 4th 620, 626-28 (Cal. CL
App. 1995) (observing that the employees had secured employment through misrepresentations on their resumes, specifically that they lied about a prior felony conviction).
145. See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883
(1995) (involving confidential documents regarding the company's financial condition).
146. Keep in mind that McKennon reversed these results. Remedies in general are not
foreclosed to the plaintiff, only certain remedies that would be inequitable under the circumstances. See id. at 886 (holding that remedies are available but that neither reinstatement nor front pay are equitable).
147. See supra Part II.A.
148. See Martin, supra note 122, at 877-78.
149. See id. (addressing the information which an employer would seek at the plaintiff's
deposition).
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B. How Rule 26(a) Helped an Employer Achieve the Goal of
Summary Judgment under the Summers Rule
With this foundation laid, it is appropriate to ask exactly how
Rule 26(a)(1) assisted an employer in attaining summary judgment
under the Summers rule. First, one must look at what "with particularity" in Rules 26(a)(1)(A) and (B) means and how it has been
interpreted.
The disclosure requirement is triggered by the allegation of
specific events within the pleading.'5 ° These events are most easily defined by what does not trigger the disclosure requirement. The
broad and conclusory notice-pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure' will not trigger this duty of mandatory disclosure.'52 A tremendous incentive is created for an employer to answer the employee's discrimination complaint with specificity and clarity, because the greater the specificity and clarity of the
allegations in the answer concerning after-acquired evidence, the
more complete the list of potential witnesses and relevant documents the plaintiff will be required to disclose to the employer. 3
It is with these allegations where all of the employer's incentives in hiring and employment procedures become important. For
example, once an employer fires an employee and the employee
files a discrimination suit, if the employer then begins an exhaustive search of records, files, employee interviews, contacts the
discharged employee's former schools and jobs, and performs other
background checks, the employer should have enough information
at his disposal to allege a defense of after-acquired evidence with
enough particularity to satisfy the prerequisites for disclosure under
Rule 26(a)(1). These procedures will enable an employer to gain
mandatory disclosures of any previously unknown legal grounds for
the discharge of the employee. This point can best be illustrated
through some of the recent cases in which Rule 26(a)(1) has been
interpreted and applied. It has been held that there is no primacy,
or hierarchy of rules, within the Federal Rules themselves.'5 4 The
mechanics and policies of Rule 26(a)(1) are to operate in conjunction with the other rules. They do not take precedence over any

150. See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & RICHARD L. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-

DIRE § 2053 (1994) (discussing mandatory initial disclosures).
151. See FED. R. CIv. P. 8(a) (requiring that a pleading contain "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief").
152. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 150, § 2053.
153. See id.
154. See In re Lotus Dev. Corp. Sec. Litig., 875 F. Supp. 48, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1995)
(holding that Rules 26(a)(1) and 9(b) must be reconciled with each other in ruling on a
motion to dismiss; neither one on its own is dispositive in a judge's decision of whether
to stay disclosures until after a motion to dismiss has been ruled upon).
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other rule, nor does any other rule neutralize them. The resolution
of any conflicting issues is to be worked out in the pre-disclosure
conference under Rule 26(f):'
The pre-disclosure, pre-discovery conference mandated by
amended Rule 26(f), followed by the Rule 16["56] conference with a judge, leading to an order that would govern
disclosure and future discovery ... will help identify and
clarify issues, thus cutting through... amorphous and
uninformative allegations. In the ideal case, parties would
immediately disclose all core information, manifestly pertinent to well-pled allegations; wrangle over the rest; and
then-if necessary-file a motion for an order compelling
disclosure or discovery pursuant to [Rule] 37.157
Thus, judges are to administer Rule 26(a) on a case-by-case basis.
The more facts showing the possible existence of after-acquired
evidence that an employer can present in the answer to the
plaintiff's pleading and at the discovery conference, the stronger
the application of Rule 26(a) will be. At least according to In re
Lotus Dev. Corp. Secs. Litig., all that is necessary to mandate
disclosure are facts from which the inference of the existence of
the defense can be drawn.' By maximizing pre-lawsuit investigatory tools, an employer should certainly be able to provide enough
facts from which the inference of the after-acquired evidence defense can be drawn. This would then trigger the automatic duty of
the plaintiff to disclose witnesses, documents, etc., to the employer.'59 Thus, a determination of what is "pleaded with particulari-

155. See supra note 100.
156. Rule 16 provides, in relevant part:
Rule 16. Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management
(b) Scheduling and Planning. . . . [The . .. judge . . . shall, after receiving
the report from the parties under Rule 26(f) or after consulting with the attorneys for the parties . . . by a scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or other
suitable means, enter a scheduling order that limits the time
(3) to complete discovery.
The scheduling order may also include
(4) modifications of the times for disclosures under Rules 26(a) and
26(e)(1) and of the extent of discovery to be permitted ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
157. Lotus, 875 F. Supp. at 51.
158. See id.
159. See Kelley v. Schwabauer, No. 95-1572-MLB, 1996 WL 447807, at *1 (D. Kan.
July 12, 1996) (stating that "a discovery request is relevant unless it is clear that the
information sought can have no possible bearing on the subject matter of the action,"
referring to a motion to compel disclosures under FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1)(B)); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) advisory committee notes (providing that "[a]ll persons
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ty," therefore triggering the duty to disclose, hinges on whether a
fact is disputed. This dispute should be discussed and settled at the
Rule 26(f) discovery conference."W
Under Rule 26(a), the existence of an employee handbook or
policy manual becomes significant. If a company utilizes a device
such as this to inform its employees about company policy and the
disciplinary measures that will be taken for a breach of that company policy, an employee will know that an employer can plead
after-acquired evidence because the employee knows, based on the
manual, that he or she could have been fired had the employer
discovered the prohibited conduct.' An employer should make
this policy manual as extensive as possible to cover all contingencies.
There is one more measure within the Federal Rules that enabled an employer to utilize discovery to gain summary judgment
based on after-acquired evidence under the Summers rule. This is
the Rule 37 sanctions provisions that were installed to ensure that
the duty to disclose was adhered to by the parties. 62 Rule 37(b)
provides a laundry list of sanctions and penalties that a court may
impose for a failure to comply with a granted motion to compel
disclosure or a failure to obey a discovery order under Rule
27(f).' These sanctions include orders designating the facts that

with . . . information should be disclosed, whether or not their testimony will be supportive of the position of the disclosing party").
160. See WRIGHT & MILER, supra note 150, § 2053.
161. See Wallace v. Dunn Constr. Co., 62 F.3d 374, 380 (lth Cir. 1995) (describing
the after-acquired evidence involved in the case as lying on employee's job application
which was explicitly stated in the company's employee handbook as a violation of company policy for which an employee could be terminated).
162. Rule 37 provides, in relevant part:
Rule 37 Failure to Make Disclosure or Cooperate in Discovery: Sanctions
(a) Motion For Order Compelling Disclosure. A party, upon reasonable notice
to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling disclosure . . . as follows:
(2) Motion.
(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a),
any other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the
movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with
the party not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the
disclosure without court action.
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Response. (Am
evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be
treated as a failure to disclose, answer or respond.
FED. R. Civ P. 37.
163. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
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were the subject of the discovery order established for the purposes
of the litigation;" prohibiting the party who refused to disclose
from opposing designated defenses; 65 striking out pleadings either
in whole or in part, staying the proceedings until the duty to disclose is complied with, until the entering of a default judgment
against the disobedient party, or until a dismissal of the action;
and prohibiting the disobedient party from using any of the nondisclosed information as evidence at trial. 67 All of these sanctions
create a huge incentive to comply with the duty of automatic disclosure. Depending on the sanction imposed, a failure to comply
can have a greater effect on the plaintiff's discrimination claim
than the actual disclosure of the after-acquired evidence itself.
Furthermore, because the information that the employer is
seeking goes to the heart of the employer's defense under the
Summers rule, the failure of the employee to comply with the
disclosure order also goes to the heart of the defendant's claim.
Consequently, the sanctions sought, and probably imposed, will
most likely be of a more severe order. Under the Summers rule,
any of these sanctions would likely result in summary judgment
being granted in favor of the employer.
Under the Summers rule, if the sanction sought under Rule
37(b)(2)(A) was to bar the plaintiff from contesting the factual
validity of the evidence that shows that the plaintiff has failed to
disclose the existence of after-acquired evidence, then the existence
of the legitimate ground upon which the employer could have;fired
the employee would be established for the purpose of the trial.
There would be no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of
the after-acquired evidence. 6 If there was no genuine issue of
material fact, summary judgment would be granted for the employer, the employee's discrimination suit would be dismissed, and the
deterrent and compensatory policies of the employment discrimination statutes would be frustrated.'69
This pattern is repeated throughout all of the Rule 37 sanctions
for non-disclosure. Under Rule 37(b)(2)(B), if a plaintiff is not
allowed to oppose the designated defense of after-acquired evidence
because it is that defense to which the disclosures were germane,
the employer would again be awarded a summary judgment. The
argument for dismissal is obvious, although it should be noted that

164. See FED. R. Civ.
165. See FED. R. CIV.
166. See FED. R. Civ.
167. See FED. R. Civ.
168. See FED. R. Civ.
eral courts).
169. See McKennon v.

P.
P.
P.
P.
P.

37(b)(2)(A).
37(b)(2)(B).
37(b)(2)(C).
37(c)(1).
56(c) (setting out the standard for summary judgment in fed-

Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 883-84 (1995).
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while this severe sanction is only granted in the most extreme
cases, this result is immaterial in our context because it is the
same as if summary judgment were granted under either
37(b)(2)(A) or (B). All of the Rule 37 sanctions require that the
failure to disclose is not harmless to the other party. 70
Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures, the Rule 26(f) discovery conference,
and Rule 37(b) sanctions for non-compliance with the duty to
disclose place a very heavy burden on an employment discrimination plaintiff who has had problems in his or her past. 7 ' It
could be argued that this defense of after-acquired evidence is pure
guess-work, however, and that Rule 26(a)(1) does not allow fishing
expeditions. m These disclosures do not, however, rely on clairvoyance, because if an employer followed the employment procedures set out above, the employer would have a good faith belief
in the existence of after-acquired evidence. This is all that is required for pleading the defense, with particularity, and triggers the
duty of the employee to disclose all after-acquired evidence. That
duty is an exceptionally heavy burden for any employment discrimination plaintiff to carry, so heavy that it would be impossible for
many plaintiffs to overcome.
This was one of the problems that faced the McKennon court.
Its solution, however, fails to correct the problem for the employment discrimination plaintiff. Even with the alteration of the afteracquired evidence doctrine under McKennon, a plaintiff's remedies
are-still too limited to deter employers from future acts of discrimination and to compensate the plaintiff for the instant act of discrimination.
Im. THE ELIMINATION OF THE AFTER-ACQUIRED
EVIDENCE DOCTRINE
The basic reasons that the McKennon Court used to overturn
the decision of the Sixth Circuit have been explored. 3 These
reasons show why the Court decided to adopt the minority view of

170. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1); see also American Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Shared Communication Servs. of 1800-80 JFK Boulevard, Inc., No. CIV.A.93-CV-3492, 1995 WL
555868, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 1995) (determining that the failure to disclose was not
harmless, even though it was unclear whether all the documents were in the non-disclosing party's possession).
171. This heavy burden on employee-plaintiffs is exceptionally true in light of the fact
that it has been estimated that close to one-third of employees have committed some kind
of resume or application fraud. See supra note 127.
172. See Paradigm Sales, Inc. v. Weber Marking Sys., Inc., 151 F.R.D. 98, 99 (N.D.
Ind. 1993) (articulating that a discovery "order cannot be construed to require a party to
disclose information concerning unpleaded claims and defenses. . . . The court's order requires basic disclosures, not clairvoyance").
173. See supra Part I.B.2.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:117

the circuits, as espoused in Mardell, as opposed to the majority
view of the circuits as espoused in Summers. At this point, these
rationales will be reexamined in light of the impact of automatic
disclosures in employment discrimination cases that hinge on afteracquired evidence. All of these rationales possess one facet that
link them together-the use of after-acquired evidence frustrates the
national policy against discrimination in employment, and the use
of mandatory disclosures adds to this frustration.
A.

ProceduralRules Cannot be Used to Frustrate Substantive
Rules of Law

The Supreme Court ruled to prevent summary judgment from
being granted in every case where an employer found previously
unknown legal grounds for discharge taken with a discriminatory
motive. To force a plaintiff to make automatic disclosures to the
former employer would often end the employee's discrimination
case. 4 This result allows the procedural rules to block a
plaintiff's access to the substantive laws and should not be allowed. 75 If unlawful discrimination indeed took place, the plaintiff should at least be able to present its case and have it decided
on its merits. 76 After all, everyone is entitled to his or her day in
court."7 In every employment discrimination case, the central
issue is whether it is more likely than not that discrimination took
place. 7 This determination cannot be made without a court hearing, and due process guarantees the right to be heard where "property is at stake in judicial proceedings."' 7 9
Given the strong federal mandate against discrimination in
employment, one would think that the existence or nonexistence of

174. It has been noted that the Summers rule would create a perverse windfall to the
employer, because but for the alleged unlawful discrimination and the litigation that it
created, the employer would not have discovered any after-acquired evidence. Thus, the
employer, through discovery procedures, is being rewarded for being sued. See Wallace v.
Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1171, 1182 (lth Cir. 1992). This is especially true in
light of the aggressive tactics that employers are encouraged to take in discrimination
suits. See John R. Webb, Discovery in Employment Discrimination Cases: The Employer's
Perspective, PRAC. LrrIGATOR, Nov. 1993, at 13 (advising litigators to take the most
aggressive approach in discovery after being sued for discrimination, in order to dig up as
much dirt on the employee as possible).
175. Cf Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that a federal procedural rule should not be applied when its effect is to seriously
frustrate a State's substantive laws).
176. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 239 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reasoning that parties are entitled to their "day in court" to ensure that they receive the full
benefit of argument before the decision of "difficult and important legal issues").
177. See id.
178. See United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983).
179. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 111 (1921).
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discrimination should be reached on its substantive merits. In an
after-acquired evidence case under the Summers rationale, the employer could admit that discrimination was present but avoid liability by asserting an affirmative defense. When the discovery procedures place that affirmative defense in the hands of the employer,
both become tools that prevent the substantive issue of discrimination from being reached on its merits. Thus, the fundamental right
to be heard,' and the strong federal mandate against discrimination in employment,'' conflict with the procedural mandatory disclosure rules. The focus now shifts to a determination of which
federal policy should take precedence over the other. The answer is
clear. In balancing a constitutional right to due process under the
Fifth Amendment' and the strong federal policy of prohibiting
discrimination in employment with the procedural policy of expediting litigation under Rule 26(a), the balance must be struck in
favor of the former.
By allowing the procedural rules to prevail, not only will the
existence of discrimination never be adjudicated, but the plaintiff
will never even make it into court and the policies behind the
employment discrimination statutes will be frustrated. This result is
especially troublesome where, in this type of case, the procedural
rules literally dictate this result. The employment discrimination
statutes are intended to deter the employer from future acts of
discrimination, to deter all employers generally from committing
workplace discrimination of any type, and to compensate those
employees who are unfortunate to be victims of workplace discrimination.'83 The unstated assumption in many after-acquired evidence cases is that the employer did intentionally discriminate
against an employee based on that employee's age, color, race,
gender, religion, or national origin. 4 There is a strong inference
that discrimination occurred, because when the employer fired the
employee, the employer did not know of a legitimate and legal
justification to fire that employee, and only learned of that justification after the employee sued his or her former employer.
It would be unfair to ignore the fact that any discrimination
occurred simply because the procedural rules make the employer

180. See id.
181. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994) (declaring that it was the intent of Congress "to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment").
182. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis and Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 37172 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
183. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 884-85.
184. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1237 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that
when an employer uses after-acquired evidence, the problem of determining the employer's
motivation at the time of discharge disappears, since the employer is, in effect, admitting
that it was motivated by an unlawful intent).
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aware of evidence of employee wrongdoing during pre-discovery
disclosures-evidence that may not have been revealed at such an
early time and in a manner so disadvantageous to the employee. It
is unfair to the employee, and to the nation's policy against all
forms of discrimination to allow the employer to escape any liability at all because of procedural mechanics. The issue now becomes
what the Supreme Court should have done to remedy this conflict.
By limiting the application of the after-acquired evidence doctrine
in McKennon, the Court took a step toward doing the right thing.
Rule 26(a) mandatory disclosures, however, will still operate to
limit available remedies to a point where the deterrent and compensatory policies behind the statutes will be frustrated. For this reason, the Court in McKennon did not go far enough in limiting the
after-acquired evidence doctrine.
B.

The Manner in Which the Court Decided to Structure
Remedies in After-Acquired Evidence Cases is
Inadequate to Further the Policies Behind the
Employment DiscriminationStatutes

The McKennon Court stated that it cannot be totally ignored
that the plaintiff engaged in some misconduct.' 5 An employer
has a legitimate business interest in the operation of his own business, and some deference must be given to the normal and legitimate hiring and firing decisions of the employer.'86 This dichotomy again underscores the importance of the effect that the procedural rules have on the substantive law. Because of the intersection
between after-acquired evidence as obtained through discovery and
the legitimate managerial decisions of the employer, the Court
found that certain remedies are unavailable to the discharged employees, namely front pay and reinstatement.'87 Thus, the Court
limits the relief available to a discriminated-against employee in
this situation to an award of back pay.'88 This, however, may
frustrate the policies behind the anti-discrimination statutes as much
as if no damages were allowed to an employee at all.'89

185. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct. at 886.
186. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 92, 146 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
189. Attorney's fees would still be available to the plaintiff, at the discretion of the
court, under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the ADEA because under
McKennon, the employer is found liable for the discriminatory acts, and therefore the
plaintiff is the "prevailing party." See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(1994) (establishing that the prevailing party in an employment discrimination suit may be
awarded attorney's fees at the court's discretion); Wells v. New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d
233, 239 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming award of attorney's fees in an ADEA suit).
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The current state of the law is that the proper method for the

calculation of a back pay award in a discrimination suit with afteracquired evidence is to allow back pay only from the date of discharge up to the date on which the employer discovers that a
legitimate reason to fire that employee existed.' 9 However, this
award is inadequate to either deter future acts of discrimination by
this or any other employer, or to compensate an employee for
having his civil rights intentionally violated. Rule 26(a) states that
the initial disclosures are to take place within ten days after the
Rule 26(f) discovery conference.' 9 ' Furthermore, the Rules also
provide that the discovery conference itself is to take place within
seventy-five days from the date that the defendant enters the
suit.'" Therefore, simple addition shows that the date by which
the initial mandatory disclosures must take place is eighty-five days
from the commencement of the action.'93 Of course, a plaintiff
always has the option not to disclose within this time, but this
subjects the employee to the onus of Rule 37 sanctions, as explained above.' 94 This is obviously not the wisest course of action

190. See McKennon, 115 S. Ct at 886 (adding that the court may also consider extraordinary equitable circumstances affecting the party's interests).
191. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
192. See FD. R. CIv. P. 26(f) (providing that the meeting be held at least 14 days
before a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), which is due at least within 90 days
after the defendant enters the suit).
193. It could be argued that the administrative powers granted to the Equal Employment
Opportunity under Title VII and the ADEA alter this length of time and therefore the
calculable back pay award. If the complainant lives in a state without a state agency
charged in that state with handling claims of employment discrimination, the EEOC has
up to 180 days from the date of the occurrence of the allegedly discriminatory conduct
by the employer to resolve the charges. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (1994). If such a
state agency exists, this time limit is extended to 300 days. This will add anywhere from
six to ten months to the calculation of a back pay award in the context of after-acquired
evidence under McKennon. Thus, the average back pay award could be increased from
$7,450 to between $22,347 to $32,279. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. This
added money could go a long way to compensating a plaintiff for being victimized by
invidious discrimination.
This will fail, however, to deter unlawful conduct on the part of the employer. Even
if a plaintiff's private suit is delayed because of this mandatory resort to agency processes, the limited remedy under the McKennon rule will still fail to competently deter employer wrongdoing. An employer can merely view this limited back pay award as a small
price to pay to create a composite workforce of its liking. See infra note 198 and accompanying text. Furthermore, this lengthy administrative process can be avoided in two situations. First, if the EEOC, after its initial investigation, decides that "prompt judicial action
is necessary to carry out the purposes of [Title VII], [it] . . . may bring an action for
appropriate . . . relief pending final disposition of such charge." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(0(2). Second, if after its initial investigation, the EEOC decides that it does not want to
pursue the charges, it may issue a right to sue letter, which allows the plaintiff to institute a private cause of action not through the EEOC. See MARK A. ROTSTEIN Er AL.,
EMPLOYMENT LAw 145 (1994). Therefore, the foregoing analysis should not be affected
by these EEOC administrative powers.
194. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text.
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for a plaintiff in this instance. Therefore, assuming that the plaintiff
files suit quickly after the discharge, and there is no reason to
think that this will not be the case, 195 and that the employer
learns of the after-acquired evidence through the initial disclosures
as outlined above, the back pay award to which the employee is
entitled under the McKennon decision is limited to three months'
salary or wages. A critical distinction must be drawn between
information gained through mandatory disclosures as opposed to
ordinary discovery. Although the information may be of the same
character regardless of when it is gained, the timing of when the
employer gains this information has huge consequences on the
employee's back pay award.
Three months' salary, for the average person, is around
$7,450.9' It is unreasonable to think that a $7,450 judgment will
vindicate or compensate an employee who has intentionally had his
civil rights violated by an employer. Moreover, there is no deterrent value in this amount. If an employer sincerely does not want
any African-Americans, or Jews, or women, or older people working in his shop, then $7,450 per discharge"w may be a small sum
to pay to assure that the employer's workforce looks like what the
employer wants it to look like. An employer may just treat this
payment as if it were any other business expense by passing the
cost on to the consumer.'9 This is not a cost of business that
consumers should have to pay."9 This outcome is compounded

195. The after-acquired evidence itself could be a deterrent to the expeditious filing of
one's suit. This will not occur, however, because after-acquired evidence does not become
an issue until after the filing of the suit. At the time of the filing, the only issue is the
employer's motivation at the time of the discharge. See Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys.,
Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1166-68 (6th Cir. 1996) (standing for the proposition that after-acquired evidence is a defense to a claim of discrimination that is only reached if the initial inquiry of whether discriminatory intent existed is found in favor of the employee).
196. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS, OH1O 15 (1993) (stating that the annual median income of a

full-time employee in Ohio is $29,796).
197. See Wehr v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 49 F.3d 1150, 1153 (6th Cir.
1995) (affirming the district court's decision to grant the plaintiff only $2,000 in back
pay, and to deny any awards of compensatory damages).
198. Cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (explaining that one of the rationale for strict liability in tort in
product liability suits is the ability of the defendant-company to pass the cost of the
lawsuit onto its consumers through marginally higher prices).
199. Cf. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization
Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1789 (1983) (citing a growth in the percentage of meritorious unfair labor practice charges along with a corresponding growth in the
average back pay award for aggrieved employees, and concluding from this that the financial penalty an employer must pay to the worker "is far too small to be a significant
deterrent"); DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW: PROCESS AND
POLICY 277-78 (3d ed. 1992) (arguing that any award of back pay under the National

Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") is insufficient to deter future similar conduct by the same
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by the fact that back pay damages are mitigated by the employee's
misconduct as represented by the after-acquired evidence.'
To examine this point further, it makes sense to look at how
the district and circuit courts have interpreted and applied
McKennon. Most of the courts in crafting their back pay awards
have not taken seriously the Supreme Court's mandate that the
compensatory and deterrent policies behind the employment discrimination statutes must be fully served."' This mandate is especially important when considered in light of the federal courts'
reluctance to extend the McKennon rationale to state law claims
ancillary to the discrimination claim that is before them.' If federal courts continue down this path regarding state law claims, the
after-acquired evidence doctrine will have to be limited further.
After-acquired evidence will then operate as a bar to all pendant
state law claims, just as it operated as a bar to federal discrimination suits under the Summers rule. Thus, if this doctrine is not
limited further or eliminated fully, wronged employees will truly be
limited to the remedies of back pay and attorney's fees to vindicate
the harm that has befallen them, because they will be restricted
from bringing any other claims from which they could receive
compensation for their harm.
Not all courts have taken such a restrictive view of McKennon
as those discussed above. For example, an Illinois district court, in
commenting on the deterrent nature of the anti-discrimination statutes as described in McKennon, stated:
[We] remain[] "fundamentally persuaded" that the prospect
of individual liability is essential if Congress' intent to
deter discriminatory employment practices is to be fully
effectuated. . . . [W]e believe that the Seventh
Circuit
has
perhaps
too
easily
dismissed the
antidiscrimination statutes' broad remedial purpose-as well

employer, since the chilling effect of this unlawful conduct on employees seeking union
representation is well worth the price to an employer seeking to avoid unionization in its
place of business).
200. See Weiler, supra note 199, at 1789-90 (arguing that the potential deterrent effect
back pay awards in unfair labor practice charges under the NLRA might have on employers is severely lessened by the discharged employee's duty to mitigate his or her damages
by actively seeking a new job).
201. But see Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 1072, 1074 (3d Cir. 1995)
(per curiam) (indicating that the district court, in crafting the appropriate remedy, should
be cognizant that one of the principal purposes of Title VII is to make victims of discrimination in employment whole again).

202. See, e.g., Duart v. FMC Wyoming Corp., 72 F.3d 117, 120 (10th Cir. 1995) (affinming the district court's determination that after-acquired evidence still acted as an
affirmative defense to claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing).
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as the objective of securing "complete justice" to victims
of discrimination ... .
In addition, the Fourth Circuit has noted that an employer, in the
discovery of after-acquired evidence, should not receive a benefit
from its act of discrimination.
It seems, from canvassing the case law subsequent to
McKennon, that the majority of the federal judicial districts have
reached a reading of McKennon that is more inhibiting to the policies of the anti-discrimination statutes than the Supreme Court
appeared to be calling for. These interpretations of McKennon add
to the urgency for the elimination of the after-acquired evidence
doctrine. If Rule 26(a)'s mandatory disclosures are operating to
limit back pay awards below the level necessary to deter future
acts of discrimination, and district and circuit courts are interpreting McKennon's holding to severely restrict the damages available
to a plaintiff in a case where the employer has proven that afteracquired evidence is indeed relevant to the damages that the court
is going to award, then the Supreme Court's desire for the "elimination of discrimination in the workplace"' 5 will go unattained.
C. Retaliation as Another Reason to Eliminate the
After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine
Both Title VII and the ADEA provide substantive statutory
remedies for retaliation by an employer against an employee based
on that employee's opposition to an unlawful employment practice
by the employer, or because of an employee's resort to the judicial
or administrative processes to remedy another act of discrimination.' This section's analysis focuses on the latter type of retaliation-free access-which proscribes retaliation for bringing a lawsuit. The basic premise is that the defense of after-acquired evidence allows an employer to engage in judicially sanctioned retaliation. With the defense as it stands after McKennon, an employer
has a strong incentive to engage in very aggressive discovery tac-

1995).
203. Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Ctrs., 886 F. Supp. 1443, 1447 (N.D. I11.
204. See Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1238 (4th Cir. 1995).
205. See McKennon, 115 S.Ct. at 884 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S.
750, 756 (1979)).
206. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (providing Title VII's retaliation provision)
with 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)(1994) (providing substantially similar language to that of Title
VII). In particular, Title VII provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this [title], or because he has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this [title].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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tics in order to obtain the limited remedy provided for by
McKennon. What the employer is doing is using the judicial process as an excuse to go after an employee for filing a discrimination suit. Certainly, an employer should not be punished for utilizing a tool granted by the Supreme Court in aggressively seeking to
acquire and use after-acquired evidence. Thus, in order to avoid
this legal form of retaliation, the after-acquired evidence doctrine
should be eliminated.
To sustain a prima facie showing of retaliation, a plaintiff
needs to establish three elements: "1) [T]he employee was engaged
in a protected activity; 2) the employee suffered adverse employment action; and, 3) there was a causal connection between the
Many courts have
protected activity and the adverse action."'
found unlawful retaliation when they justify some adverse treatment
of an employee on grounds that relate to the filing of a discrimination suit.
The most illustrative example that relates to this context is
Womack v. Munson. 8 There, the employee was previously employed by the county sheriff, discharged, and them employed by
The
the defendant, the state prosecutor, as an investigator.'
plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC regarding his termination
by the sheriff during his employment for the defendant. In the
course of its own internal investigation, the defendant questioned
the plaintiff, and subsequently discharged him. The court found that
the plaintiff had a legal basis to bring a claim of retaliation. Thus,
it was clear that the defendant fired the plaintiff because of the
allegations in the complaint and because of the plaintiff's participation in the judicial process.21 Womack presents the converse of
the after-acquired evidence problem. In Womack, the plaintiff was
fired because of participation in the legal process; in an after-acquired evidence scenario, the employer utilizes the judicial process
to create a justification for why the employee was fired in the first
place. If the employer is liable for retaliation in the former scenario, why should he not be in the latter?
In defending against a charge of discrimination, the employer
must be careful not to act to infringe on the retaliation provisions.2 " In EEOC v. United Ass'n of Journeymen,"2 the court

207. Reed v. Shepard, 939 F.2d 484, 492 (7th Cir. 1991).
208. 619 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1980).
209. See id.at 1294.
210. See id.at 1297.
211. See EEOC v. United Ass'n of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing Indus.,
Local 189, 311 F. Supp. 464, 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970) (suppressing statements made by
complainant to employer under intimidating circumstances).
212. 311 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Ohio 1970).
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found the interrogation of various employees to be coercive and
therefore violative of the retaliation provision.2 13 Furthermore,
courts have held retaliation existed where an employer retaliates
against past employees." 4 Finally, an employer must be careful to
ensure that conduct that would otherwise be lawful is not transformed into unlawful conduct by a plaintiff arguing pretext."5 For
example, where an employer fired an employee for a discriminatory reason, but discovered good cause to fire that employee through
a program of surveillance that was instituted because the employees
were opposing the employer's employment policies, the surveillance
was found to be unlawful retaliation.216
All of these cases could be summarized as standing for the
proposition that to utilize discovery to look for after-acquired evidence is unlawful retaliation, since the employer is looking for
evidence with the intent of undermining the plaintiff's discrimination claim. The alternative to this statement is simply, "So what?"
What is so wrong with using a discovery tool that the legislature
has provided exactly for the purpose of gathering information for
trial? What is so wrong is that if the requisite intent to retaliate2 7
is present, then the employer has unlawfully retaliated. What is
needed is the same pretext analysis as is done under McDonnell
Douglas and its progeny to determine if the employer has this
intent. The best enunciation of this premise comes from the Third
Circuit
[I]n a normal Title VII or ADEA case, evidence acquired
before the adverse employment decision might, as a prophylactic measure, be inadmissible altogether if the plaintiff
could show that the employer had a practice of thoroughly
investigating the information provided in employment applications and interviews by, and of comprehensively reviewing on-the-job performance of, only or primarily only the
members of a protected class with the motive to discover
flaws justifying an adverse employment action, for such a
practice would probably contravene Title VII and

213. See id. at 466-68.
214. See Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
former employee has standing to sue for retaliation under Title VII); EEOC v. Cosmair,
Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a past employee is an
.employee' for the purposes of a retaliation claim under the ADEA).
215. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
216. See Francis v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1972).
217. If the employee had "opposed any practice, made an unlawful employment practice
by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]," such requisite intent may be present. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a) (1994).

1996]

AFTER-ACQUIRED EVIDENCE

ADEA.... [This] defense strategy of investigating employees who file complaints with the intent to discover
evidence retroactively justifying or excusing the adverse
employment decision may itself violate Title VII and
ADEA, and if so it might be contrary to the design of
those statutes to allow the employer to benefit from [such]
evidence 1
Thus, it is easy to visualize how a fishing expedition to find afteracquired evidence could be unlawful retaliation 9
If these disclosures operate to require a plaintiff to turn over
any after-acquired evidence to the employer at this early stage of
the litigation,' the ability of a plaintiff to sue an employer for
retaliation for use of discovery would be severely stilted. Even if
the employer had the intent to discriminate, there would be no
corresponding act of retaliation. Thus, this strong disincentive to
prevent employers from punishing individuals for filing discrimination suits, and therefore help spur more people to make use of
Title VII's and the ADEA's means for redressing discrimination in
the workplace, would be removed. These disclosures punish the
employee for being discriminated against. The employee is being
harmed twice, once by the employer and once by the courts. It is
for this reason that the after-acquired evidence doctrine should be
eliminated from the face of employment discrimination law.
CONCLUSION

While it is true that there were many instances of after-acquired evidence defenses long before the amendment of Rule 26 in
1993, it is also true that this new rule greatly pushes forward the
time in litigation when disclosures are made. This advance in the
time-frame of an employer's discovery of a legitimate ground for
discharge works to the disadvantage of the employee in exactly the
manner sought to be eliminated by the Supreme Court in
McKennon. By failing to recognize this outcome, the Supreme
Court fell short of its goal of removing impediments from the
effective operation of the statutory scheme against employment
discrimination, and consequently failed to validate the substantive

218. Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994); see also
Russell v. Microdyne Corp., 65 F.3d 1229, 1240 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting the defendant's
cautiousness in seeking discovery of potential after-acquired evidence, in trying to avoid
opening itself up to liability for retaliation).
219. See Massey v. Trump's Castle Hotel & Casino, 828 F. Supp. 314, 323-24 (D.NJ.
1993) (noting that "[t]he fact that the misconduct was discovered only as a byproduct of
the employer's illegal actions cannot be minimized or overlooked").
220. See supra Part III.A.
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policies of deterrence and compensation. It is apparent that Rule 26
will still have a very severe effect on employment discrimination
cases, but not so great as to bar a plaintiff from any recovery at
all. It merely limits a plaintiff's recovery to such a point where the
policies behind the statutes are undermined. The procedural rules
are still allowed to operate to the disadvantage of the substantive
operation of and policies behind the substantive law.
The only way to fix this problem is to eliminate the after-acquired evidence defense from employment discrimination law. As
long as we take seriously the commitment to eliminate invidious
workplace discrimination from the factories, warehouses, and offices that are in business all over our country, the after-acquired
evidence defense has no place in discrimination law. The
McKennon decision has been widely praised as a great decision for
workers who belong to protected classes." The effect of this decision, however, will be a limited one, because an employee's
ability to receive compensation and vindication for an intentional
wrong will not increase by enough of a degree to deter future acts
of discrimination by the employer. Thus, statutes such as the
ADEA will continue to be frustrated every time an employer successfully uses the defense of after-acquired evidence in the remedial stage of the litigation. The operation of the doctrine may have
been altered from an affirmative defense to a mechanism to mitigate damages, but the end result will be the same. The Court feels
that back pay is the only equitable remedy appropriate in cases
where after-acquired evidence is present. These back pay awards,
through the operation of Rule 26(a) and the early discovery of
after-acquired evidence in the litigation process, will generally be
low, and therefore future acts of discrimination will not be deterred
to the extent that the Supreme Court hoped and envisioned. The
after-acquired evidence doctrine, although shifted to the damages
phase of the litigation, will still operate as "an insidious defense. ' "m
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221. See, e.g. James H. Coil Im & Lori J. Shapiro, Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right:
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